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SUMMARY
This article examines sections 142(A), 143, 146 and 51 of the Labour Rela-
tions Act 66 of 1995, which deal with the enforcement of CCMA arbitration 
awards, and section 33 of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 which deals with the 
enforcement of non-CCMA arbitration awards.
It analyses the relevant case law and highlight the real practical difficulties 
facing worker litigants in enforcing arbitration awards in their favour. Sections 
143 and 158 (1) (g) of the LRA and the relevant case law are also examined.
The final section of the article deals with the enforcement of collective and 
settlement agreements and analyses  sections 23, 24, 31,32, 33A, 51A and 
158 (i) (c) of the LRA and relevant case law. The essential role of bargain-
ing councils in monitoring and enforcing collective agreements is also high-
lighted. 
The article concludes that ‘[t]he challenge facing the labour movement is to 
equip its organisers with the legal knowledge and drafting skills to negotiate 
and draft agreements which best promote the interests of workers and avoid 
legal pitfalls when trying to enforce agreements which are challenged by an 
employer’.
1  INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of individual and collective worker rights are critical in giv-
ing effect to hard-won labour movement struggles which culminated in the 
enactment of our current Labour Relations Act.1 This article will briefly ad-
dress the basic legal issues concerning the enforcement of arbitration awards, 
collective agreements and settlement agreements in both the private and 
public sector and in doing so will cite relevant provisions of the LRA and the 
Arbitration Act.2 Hopefully it will assist in highlighting some of the problem-
atic issues which need to be critically addressed and debated. 
1 66 of 1995 (the LRA)
2 42 of 1965.
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2  ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
Importantly, the amended section 143(1) of the LRA now specifically pro-
vides that an award issued by a CCMA commissioner is final and binding 
and may be enforced as if it were an order of the Labour Court, unless it was 
an advisory award.
For this to happen, section 143(3) of LRA provides that the CCMA director 
must certify that the arbitration award is a binding one. CCMA Rule 40 pre-
scribes the procedure necessary to obtain certification of an arbitration award 
by the CCMA director. Certain formalities must be observed in bringing an 
application for certification of an award. First, a form 7.18 must be completed 
if it is a CCMA award that requires certification and form 7.18A if it is a bar-
gaining council award. Both are in the form of an affidavit deposed to by the 
applicant or his or her representative, attesting to the fact that an arbitration 
award was made and proof that a copy of the award has been served on the 
respondent.
The respondent is then invited to make written representations within four-
teen (14) days to the CCMA director as to why the award should not be certi-
fied as a binding award in terms of section143 (3).
Once the applicant has successfully obtained the certification of the award, 
the next step is to obtain a warrant of execution (herein after referred to as 
a writ) issued by the Registrar of the Labour Court for the payment of an 
amount of money. The writ must then be handed to the Sheriff of the Court 
who is directed to attach and take into execution the moveable goods of the 
respondent and cause to be realised by public auction, the sum of money 
awarded to the applicant, plus interest (currently at a rate of 15.5%) from the 
date of the award and the taxed costs of the applicant.3
If the other party fails to comply with an arbitration award that orders the 
performance of an act, other than the payment of an amount of money, the 
applicant may initiate contempt proceedings in the Labour Court in order to 
obtain the desired relief.4 A classic example would be that of an award that 
retrospectively reinstates a worker where the employer fails to pay the arrear re-
muneration or to reinstate the worker. In such a case, the worker could obtain 
a writ to recover the sum of money awarded and initiate contempt proceedings 
in the Labour Court to compel the employer to reinstate him or her. 5
The challenge facing a worker who is not a trade union member in suc-
cessfully enforcing an award for financial compensation and reinstatement 
are indeed formidable, especially if he or she cannot afford the services of an 
attorney. I am reliably informed that, before attempting to execute a writ of 
execution, Sheriffs of the Court often insist on upfront payment of their fees 
by the worker.
3 Part 3 of Form 7.18, contained in Labour Relations GNR 1442 of 10 October 2003
4 S 143(4), LRA
5 In terms of s 142(9), LRA. For the procedure in bringing a contempt referral before the Labour Court, 
see Labour Court Rule 7 in Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour Court (GNR 1665 of 
14 October 1996).
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I am sure many readers, will have personal experience of the many practi-
cal difficulties confronting trade unions when seeking enforcement of their 
members’ awards. The amended section 51(8) of the LRA now significantly 
facilitates the enforcement of bargaining councils’ awards by means of the 
provisions of section 143 of the LRA, provided that a collective agreement 
does not provide otherwise. The effect of section 51(8) is that the procedure 
in section 143 is available to enforce the award of a bargaining council with-
out the need to make it an order of the Labour Court.
In MIBCO v Osborne & Others6 Landman J found that the terms of the col-
lective agreement of the bargaining council excluded the operation of the 
LRA, as permitted in terms of section 51(9), but that the council was enti-
tled to approach it in terms of section 31 of the Arbitration Act instead of 
section 158(1)(c) of the LRA to have its award made an order of court. The 
enforcement of arbitration awards by means of the amended section 143 was 
intended to avoid the expensive, cumbersome and time-consuming direct en-
forcement of awards of the Labour Court prior to 2002. As Landman J states 
‘upon certification by the director of the CCMA, the award is deemed to be an order of the 
Labour Court for the purposes of enforcing it. This is intended to be a more expeditious 
and less expensive means for a successful party to enforce an award’.
The original section 143 of the LRA provided that an arbitration award is-
sued by a commissioner is final and binding and may be made an order of 
the Labour Court in terms of section 158 1(c), unless it is an advisory award. 
It is important to note that the certification of an arbitration award does not 
change the status of the award, as it still remains an award. This was con-
firmed in Tony Gois t/a Shakespear’s Pub v Van Zyl & Others7 where Wagley 
J held that the CCMA had jurisdiction in terms of section 144 of the LRA to 
rescind an arbitration award that has been certified by the director. The rea-
soning of the court was as follows:
‘the new section 143 did not alter the nature or composition of the award. The award still 
remains a CCMA award and is not transformed into a Labour Court order as a result of 
the certification process and as such there is no need to involve this court in the process 
of rescinding CCMA awards’.
It was held that the aim of the amended section 143 was to simplify the 
procedure of enforcing CCMA awards. Requiring the Labour Court to first 
set aside the certification and the writ of execution before an award can be 
rescinded, therefore, was not intended by the LRA.
The effect of an application for rescission in terms of section 144 of the LRA 
on the enforcement of arbitration awards in terms of section 143 will now be 
briefly considered.
The impact of section 144 on the enforcement of an arbitration award can 
best be illustrated by way of an example. A worker has successfully obtained 
an arbitration award in his favour at an arbitration hearing at which the em-
ployer was absent. The employer immediately brings an application for re-
scission of the award in terms of section 144 (a) of the LRA on the grounds 
 
6 [2003] 6 BLLR 573 (LC)
7 [2003] 11 BLLR 1176 (LC)
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that it was unaware of the arbitration hearing as it had not received notice. 
The worker may now oppose the employer’s application for rescission by 
filing his own affidavit(s) and at the same time awaiting the arbitration re-
scission ruling. If successful, the worker can now enforce the award. The 
employer may, however, decide to review the rescission ruling in terms of sec-
tion 158(1) (g) of the LRA in the Labour Court. The aggrieved worker may still 
pursue the enforcement of the arbitration award in terms of section 143 of the 
LRA unless the employer successfully applies for the stay of the enforcement 
of the award pending a review of the award by the Labour Court. 
Only if the by now frustrated worker survives the ordeal of the Labour Court 
review proceedings will he finally be in a position to invoke the provisions of 
section 143 to enforce his award, provided of course that the employer does 
not successfully obtain the Labour Court’s leave to appeal to the Labour Ap-
peal Court. 
To sum up: even if our worker has already obtained certification of his 
arbitration award in terms of section 143, the persistent employer has the 
right in terms of section 144(a) to bring a rescission application.8 In Siyaka 
Cleaning Services CC v Nohlanga9 it was held that a section 144 application 
to rescind an award does not constitute lis pendens,10 so that a party seeking 
rescission is obliged to apply to the Labour Court for a stay of the execution 
of the award. 
It is interesting to note the Labour Court judgment in Cross Border Road 
Transport Agency v Mpato & Others,11 where the CCMA had notified an em-
ployer of an application to convert an award which was not in his favour 
into an order of court in terms of section 143. Although duly invited to make 
written representations opposing the application within fourteen days, the 
employer’s opposing papers were filed one day late with the CCMA. It was 
held that the CCMA director was entitled to proceed with the certification of 
the award.
The major obstacle facing a worker in enforcing an award is, of course, the 
possible review of the arbitration award in terms of section 145 or section 
158(1)(g) of the LRA (or section 33 of the Arbitration Act, if it is a private 
arbitration award). 
It is not my intention to explore the complex jurisprudence of the review of 
arbitration awards but merely to make certain observations and comments of 
immediate relevance to the enforcement of awards. It should be noted that in 
the matter of Oliver v University of Venda12 it was held that a review applica-
tion to the Labour Court does not automatically stay the enforcement of an 
 
8 Ibid.
9 [2002] 5 BLLR 482 LC.
10 Lis pendens is a legal defence, meaning that a legal action involving the same claim between the 
same parties is already pending before another court. An application for rescission, in other words, is 
treated as a separate action from that which led to the award which the employer is trying to rescind. 
This means that an employer who has applied for rescission cannot raise a claim of lis pendens in 
the original proceedings.
11 [2003] 10 BLLR 992.
12 [2005] 5 BLLR 47 (LC).
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award. The applicant has to apply to the Labour Court for a stay of the award 
pending review thereof. 
I understand that it is now general practice to launch both an application 
for review and for the stay of execution of the award. It is well known that 
unscrupulous employers often adopt dilatory tactics by making an applica-
tion for review of the arbitration award and successfully staying the execution 
of the award as an order of court but then not expediting their application. 
This has the effect of postponing the finalisation of the review proceedings 
indefinitely. 
Unfortunately, unlike the High Court Uniform Rules, the current Labour 
Court rules do not specifically deter or prevent applicants from failing to ex-
pedite their review applications. As a result, an aggrieved worker may be 
forced to engage the services of an attorney to bring an urgent application to 
the Labour Court for an order compelling the employer to expedite the review 
application within a specified period, failing which it will be barred from pro-
ceeding with the review. 
An amendment to the current Labour Court rules might well address the is-
sue and assist workers in tackling the problem of spurious review applications 
which have the effect of frustrating the enforcement of arbitration awards. It 
is important to note that no appeal lies to the Labour Court to overturn arbi-
tration awards. The distinction between review and appeal is well established 
in South African law. For example, in Lekota v FNB of SA Ltd13 it was pointed 
out the Labour Court’s review function is not to decide whether the commis-
sioner acted correctly but whether he or she was guilty of misconduct or of a 
gross irregularity or had exceeded his or her powers. 
Section 51(8) of the LRA provides that, unless otherwise agreed in a col-
lective agreement, section 142 A and sections 143 to 146 of the LRA apply 
to any arbitration conducted under the auspices of a bargaining council. In 
other words, bargaining council arbitration awards are reviewable in terms of 
section 145 of the LRA and not section 33 of the Arbitration Act.14 In Dort-
props (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others15 it was held that the Labour Court can only 
review an order that has been made an order of court in terms of section 158 
(1)(c) of the LRA if an application to rescind the order has been made.
In PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture & Others16 it was held that awards 
and rulings are not considered ‘administrative actions’ and as such are not re-
viewable in terms of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act.17 However, the Su-
preme Court of Appeal has now ruled that CCMA awards constitute administra-
tive acts and are therefore subject to review not only in terms of section 145 of 
the LRA but also under the far more extensive grounds for review laid down in 
PAJA.18 However, the time limits laid down in section 145 are not affected.
13 [1998] 40 BLLR 1021 (LC). See also Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO & others [1998] 11 BLLR
14 42 of 1965.
15 [1998] BLLR
16 [2004] 8 BLLR 822 (LC). [2004] 25 ILJ 1750 (LC)
17 Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’)
18 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & Others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA)
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Interestingly, in Venture Otto SA (Pty) Ltd v MIBC & Others19 it was held 
that an employer who undertook to abide by an award was barred from tak-
ing the matter on review because he had acquiesced to the award.
It is important to take note that in terms of section 146 of the LRA, the Arbi-
tration Act does not apply to any arbitration conducted under the auspices of 
the CCMA. In this regard, section 51 (8) of the LRA extends the same provi-
sion to bargaining council arbitrations. 
I shall not deal with the relationship between section 145 of the LRA and 
section 33 (1) of the Arbitration Act. In NUM v Bern NO & Another,20 how-
ever, it was held that when reviewing a private arbitration in terms of section 
33(1) of the Arbitration Act, the Labour Court, must apply the same standards 
as those applicable to the review of CCMA awards.
It is settled law that rulings concerning condonation and the refusal to re-
scind an award are not reviewable by the Labour Court in terms of section 
145 but rather in terms of section 158(g) of the LRA. Interestingly, in Topics 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others21 the court held that the Labour Court may even 
review proceedings by a commissioner while the arbitration proceedings are 
in progress ‘where justice may not by any other means be obtained or where 
a gross irregularity has occurred or where grave injustice may result.’ 
A successful review of an arbitration award usually results in the award be-
ing set aside and the dispute being referred to the CCMA or bargaining coun-
cil to be arbitrated before another commissioner or arbitrator, as the case may 
be. However, a worker who successfully opposes an employer’s application to 
review an arbitration award in his or her favour may still be unable to enforce 
the award, should the employer successfully apply to the Labour Court22 for 
leave to appeal to the Labour Appeal Court.
Even an application for leave to appeal, like the noting of an appeal, has 
the effect of suspending the Labour Court’s review judgment. Should the em-
ployer succeed in obtaining the Labour Court’s leave to appeal to the LAC, 
but be unsuccessful in the appeal itself, the employer may still appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).23
The incidence of employers failing to comply with arbitration awards in 
both the private and public sectors is borne out by the following national 
CCMA statistics for the month of December 2006 alone.
Eastern Cape (East London) 7




19 [2005] 3 BLLR 300 (LC)
20 [1998] 8 BLLR 49 (LC)
21 [1998] 10 BLLR 1071 (LC)
22 In terms of s 166(1) of the LRA
23 In NUMSA and Others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA) it was held that section 183 
of the LRA, which confers final appellate authority on the LAC in respect of Labour Court judgments, 
must be read subject to section 167 of the Constitution, which has the effect of vesting the SCA with 
the power to hear appeals from the LAC in both constitutional and non-constitutional matters.
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KwaZulu-Natal (PMB) 9







The numbers of bargaining council arbitration awards which employers failed 
to honour in December 2006 are as follows:




How many of these workers successfully pursued the enforcement of arbitra-
tion awards made in their favour is a moot point. Recalcitrant employers in 
both the public and private sector could face the wrath of the trade union, 
which could conduct a ‘name and shame’ exercise, besides which adverse 
publicity could also exert added moral pressure to deter future defaulters.
3   ENFORCEMENT OF COLLECTIVE AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS
Section 213 of the LRA defines a collective agreement as a ‘written agree-
ment concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of 
mutual interest concluded by one or more registered trade unions on the one 
hand and, on the other hand
(a) one or more employers;
(b) one or more registered employers’ organisations; or
(c) one or more employers and one or more registered employers’ organisa-
tions’.
More importantly, section 23 of LRA spells out in detail the extent to which 
a collective agreement is legally binding. Section 24(1) provides that every 
collective agreement (excluding an agency shop or closed shop agreement 
or a settlement agreement contemplated in terms of section 142A or section 
158(1)(c)) must provide for a procedure to resolve any dispute about the in-
terpretation and application of the collective agreement.
This article will not survey all the case law regarding the enforceability of 
collective agreements but merely highlight some of the more interesting deci-
sions by courts and arbitrators.
In Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v FAWU & Others24 it was held that the em-
ployers to whom a collective agreement is extended in terms of section 23 
(1)(d) of the LRA must be identified in the collective agreement. In the above 
matter, because this had not been done, there was held to be no agreement 
 
24  [2004] 7 BLLR 628 (LC)
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on a wage increase that was binding on the non-union employees, who thus 
remained free to strike so as to secure better wages for themselves.
In SACCAWU v Garden Route Chalets (Pty) Ltd25 the arbitrator held that a 
collective agreement could not override statutory provisions unless the stat-
ute expressly provided for it.
In Majola v MEC Department of Public Works, Northern Province & Others26 
it was held that despite the provisions of section 24 of the LRA ‘an arbitrator 
is entitled to refuse to apply a collective agreement if just cause exists not to 
apply it’.
Thus in MEC, Department of Finance, Economic Affairs & Tourism, Northern 
Province v Mahumeni27 it was held that in any dispute about the interpreta-
tion and application of a collective agreement the parties should first attempt 
to resolve the dispute through conciliation and only resort to arbitration if the 
dispute remains unresolved.
Section 24(2) of the LRA provides that if there is a dispute about the inter-
pretation or application of a collective agreement, any party to that dispute 
may refer the dispute in writing to the CCMA if
(a) the collective agreement does not provide for a procedure as required by 
section 24(1);
(b) the procedure provided for in the collective agreement is not operative; 
or 
(c) any party to the collective agreement has frustrated the resolution of the 
dispute in terms of the collective agreement.
Suffice it to say that, in general, our courts have upheld the primacy of col-
lective agreements and their applicability to non-members even where the 
agreement appears to be detrimental to the latter, provided that the require-
ments of section 23(1)(d) are complied with28. Thus, in Tsetswana v Blyvoor-
zicht Gold Mining Co. Ltd29 the court found that the applicant’s contention 
that he was not bound by a collective agreement concluded with the trade 
union of which he was not a member was without substance or foundation. 
Section 24 of the LRA in principle confers exclusive jurisdiction on the 
CCMA or bargaining council arbitrators to determine a dispute about the in-
terpretation and application of a collective agreement. In SA Motor Industry 
Employers’ Association v NUMSA & Others30 the court upheld the principle 
that every collective agreement must provide for a procedure to resolve dis-
putes as to its interpretation and application. This procedure should entail 
first conciliation and only then arbitration and only where no such procedure 
is provided, should resort be had to the CCMA.
25  [1997] 3 BLLR 325 (CCMA)
26  [2004] 1 BLLR 54 (LC)
27  [2005] 2 BLLR 173 (SCA)
28  See Mzeku & Others v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd & Others [2001] 8 BLLR 857 (LAC)
29  [1999] 4 BLLR 404 (LC)
30  [1997] 9 BLLR 1157 (LAC)
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In FAWU v Premier Foods Industries Ltd (Epic Foods Division)31 Basson J 
declined to grant an interdict requiring compliance with a collective agree-
ment on the grounds that the trade unions had an adequate remedy to ensure 
compliance in terms of section 24 of the LRA. However, in Fredericks & Oth-
ers v MEC for Education Training Eastern Cape & Others32 the Constitutional 
Court held that the High Court does have jurisdiction to consider disputes 
concerning collective agreements if a breach of a constitutional rights has 
been alleged. Similarly, in Bester v Sol Plaatje Municipality & Others33 the 
High Court held that section 24 of the LRA does not remove its jurisdiction 
where the applicant seeks to enforce his or her constitutional right to just 
administrative action. 
Section 24 of the LRA is applicable to bargaining council agreements and 
bargaining councils should provide for the arbitration of disputes about the 
interpretation and application of agreements by arbitrators appointed for that 
purpose. In NUCW v Oranje Mynbou en Vervoer Maatskappy Bpk34 Revelas 
J held that enforcement of an agreement only becomes an issue when there 
is some form of non-compliance with that agreement. When a party wishes 
to enforce the agreement, in other words, it would be because it believes the 
agreement is applicable to the party who is in breach thereof. Therefore a 
‘dispute about the application of a collective agreement’ applies to the situ-
ation where there is non-compliance with a collective agreement and one of 
the parties wishes to enforce its terms. Consequently, the CCMA, and not 
the Labour Court, should entertain disputes arising from the non-compliance 
with collective agreements. 
In Ceramic Industries Limited t/a Betta Sanitaryware v NCBAWU & Others35 
it was held that a strike flowing from the interpretation and application of a 
collective agreement which should have been referred to arbitration is not 
protected. Section 65 (1)(c) prohibits a strike if ‘the issue in dispute is one 
that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court’ in 
terms of the LRA.
However, the courts have always emphasised that the substance of the 
dispute must be scrutinised in order to ascertain its true nature. In Adams 
& Others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd36 Zondo J disagreed with the em-
ployer’s contention that the workers’ strike was unprotected as the issue in 
dispute was about the interpretation and application of the council’s agree-
ment. He found that the issue in dispute in fact concerned a demand for pay 
equalisation. 
In SACTWU v Best Clothing (Pty) Ltd37 the arbitrator held that because the 
terms and conditions of a collective agreement were clear and unambigu-
ous, additional evidence to alter its meaning was inadmissible. Similarly, in 
31 [1997] 6 BLLR 753 (LC)
32 [2002] 2 BLLR 119 (CC)
33 [2004] 9 BLLR 965 (NC)
34 [2000] 2 BLLR 190 (LC)
35 [1997] 5 BLLR 547 (LC)
36 [1998] 12 BLLR 1238 (LC)
37 [1997] 5 BLLR 658(CCMA)
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Airport Handling Services (Pty) Ltd v TOWU & Others38 the judge dismissed 
the union’s argument that, as written collective agreements co-existed with 
an oral agreement and the written agreements still required ratification, the 
court should take into account the terms of the written agreements only. The 
judge applied the parol evidence rule39 used in the interpretation of contracts 
to dismiss the union’s argument. 
In NE Cape Forests v SAAPAWU & Others40 Froneman DJP held that a col-
lective agreement in terms of the LRA is not an ordinary contract and the 
context within which a collective agreement operates under the Act is vastly 
different from that of an ordinary commercial contact. The court emphasised 
that a practical approach to the interpretation and application of the collec-
tive agreement was the preferred one to give effect to the primary objects of 
the LRA, rather than the traditional common law contractual principles. The 
court also held that the terms of a collective agreement regarding strike action 
that had been ratified by striking workers was binding on them for the dura-
tion of the strike, despite the prior cancellation of the agreement.
Significantly, rights conferred by a collective agreement may also be waived. 
In this regard the arbitrator in SAMWU v Mangaung Local Municipality 
(MLM)41 found that although the parties to the collective agreement had in-
tended to make provision for a forum for the purposes of negotiation and con-
sultation on a number of issues including the recruitment and appointment 
of council officials, such forum had failed to even discuss the appointment 
of the interviewees concerned. The respondent was thus entitled to advertise 
the posts and appoint the candidates.
In NEHAWU obo Senekane  & Others v PACOFS42 the CCMA commissioner 
found that a collective agreement providing for the retrenchment of workers 
expressly stipulated that the employer merely consider the retrenchees for va-
cancies and thereby did not confer on retrenchees a right to be re-employed. 
In Northern Cape Province Administration v Hambidge NO & Others43 Land-
man J held that the dispute resolution provisions in a collective agreement 
were inoperative and in terms of section 24 (2) of the LRA, the CCMA had 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
Section 31 of the LRA deals with the binding nature of collective agreements 
concluded in a bargaining council. In Reactor Clothing (Pty) Ltd v Robertson 
& Others44 it was held that a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining 
council binds the parties and their members as soon as it is concluded, pro-
vided it is in accordance with the council’s constitution. 
Section 32 of the LRA provides for the extension of collective agreements 
concluded in a bargaining council to non-parties. In Kim Lin Fashions CC 
38 [2004] 25 ILJ 117 (LC)
39 This rule states that, where an agreement is in writing, the introduction of oral or other evidence that 
contradicts it is inadmissible.
40 [1997] 6 BLLR 711 (LAC)
41 [2004] 10 BLLR 1270 (CCMA)
42 [2004] 4 BLLR 515 (CCMA)
43 [1999] 8 BLLR 848 (LC)
44 [1998] 3 BLLR 315 (LC)
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v Bruntos & Others45 it was held that as soon as the Minister of Labour has 
extended a collective agreement to a non-party in terms of section 32 (2) of 
the LRA, such a party is bound by its terms and can only be released if an 
exemption is granted or the extension is set aside by an order of court.
In Tiger Wheels Babelegi (Pty) Ltd t/a TSW International v NUMSA & Oth-
ers46 it was held that where a bargaining council agreement has been ex-
tended to non-parties and the dispute resolution provisions in the collective 
agreement are inoperative in terms of section 24(2) of the LRA, the CCMA 
has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. In the same case it was held that 
where a bargaining council agreement has been extended to non-party em-
ployers, individual notice of the commencement of a strike need not be given 
once the bargaining council has been advised. 
In Tua King Metal Industry (Pty) Ltd v Pooe No & Others47 it was held that 
an exemption from a bargaining council agreement expires when the agree-
ment is replaced with another. Accordingly, a party seeking a further exemp-
tion has to make a fresh application for exemption. 
Section 33A of the LRA provides for the enforcement of collective agree-
ments by bargaining councils. Section 33A(1) clearly empowers bargaining 
councils to monitor and enforce compliance with their collective agreements 
in terms of the section itself or a collective agreement concluded by the par-
ties to the council. It is important to note that a collective agreement for the 
purposes of section 33A of the LRA is defined as including
(a) any basic condition of employment which, in terms of section 49 (1) of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, constitutes a term of employ-
ment of any employee covered by the collective agreement; and
(b)  the rules of any fund or scheme established by the bargaining council.
Section 33 A (3) provides that a collective agreement may authorise a bar-
gaining council agent to issue compliance orders requiring any person bound 
by the collective agreement to comply with the collective agreement within a 
specified period. 
Section 33A(8) of the LRA provides that an arbitrator conducting an arbi-
tration in terms of this section may make an appropriate award which may 
include
(a)  ordering any person to pay an amount owing in terms of a collective 
agreement;
(b)  imposing a fine for a failure to comply with a collective agreement in ac-
cordance with subsection (13);
(c)  charging a party an arbitration fee;
(d)  ordering a party to pay the costs of the arbitration; and
(e)  confirming, varying or setting aside a compliance order issued by a desig-
nated agent in terms of subsection (4).
45 [1998] 3 BLLR 315 (LC)
46 [1999] 1 BLLR 66 (LC)
47 [2006] 5 BLLR 456 (LAC)
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Most importantly, section 33A(10) provides that the award in an arbitration 
conducted in terms of this section is final and binding and may be enforced 
in terms of section 143.
Section 142A of the LRA provides that the CCMA ‘may, by agreement be-
tween the parties or on application by a party, make any settlement agree-
ment in respect of any dispute that has been referred to the Commission, an 
arbitration award’. A settlement agreement is defined as a written agreement 
in settlement of a dispute that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to 
the Labour Court, excluding an essential services award.
It is clear that only so-called ‘rights disputes’ are capable of being included 
in a settlement agreement which may be made an arbitration award. Signifi-
cantly, section 51 (8) of the LRA provides that unless otherwise agreed to in 
a collective agreement, section 142 A and sections 143 to 146 apply to any 
arbitration conducted under the auspices of a bargaining council. In terms 
of section 158 1(c) of the LRA, the Labour Court may make any arbitration 
award or any settlement agreement an order of the Court. 
The new section 142A defines a settlement agreement, for the purposes of 
section 158(1)(c), as ‘a written agreement in settlement of a dispute that a 
party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the Labour Court’, excluding 
a dispute arising in an essential or maintenance service that a party is only 
entitled to refer to arbitration in terms of section 74 (4) or 75 (7) of the LRA. 
4  CONCLUSION
A well-resourced and recalcitrant employer presently has the means to frus-
trate and indeed thwart the enforcement of arbitration awards despite the 
2002 amendments to the LRA, thereby undermining the constitutional right 
of employees to fair labour practices.
The labour movement, especially in unionised industries, has a number 
of non-legal options at its disposal. These include publicity campaigns and 
tabling the issue at a bargaining council.
A major challenge facing the labour movement is how to put pressure on an 
employer in a non-unionised workplace to honour arbitration awards.
Unfortunately, the only way to enforce an arbitration award which orders 
the re-instatement of a worker is to bring an application for contempt of court 
in the Labour Court.
That labour relations are becoming increasingly judicialised is well illustrated 
by the current labour law dealing with the enforcement of collective and set-
tlement agreements. The challenge facing the labour movement is to equip its 
organisers with the legal knowledge and drafting skills to negotiate and draft 
agreements which best promote the interests of workers and avoid legal pitfalls 
when trying to enforce agreements which are challenged by an employer.
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